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Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving 
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migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact 
between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, 
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contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in 
their way? 
A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in 
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migrants in the host country remains to be done. 
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Abstract 
This report analyzes migration processes from Ukraine and Russia to Poland from the perspectives of 
the political frameworks existing in both the sending and receiving countries, with special attention to 
links between integration and diaspora policies and their roles in shaping migration flows and 
integration practices. The report is based on both quality and quantitative original research, including 
the exploratory survey targeted representatives of civil organizations working with migrants conducted 
in INTERACT project. The research confirms that there is a serious gap between the legal and 
institutional state’s frameworks, and their implementation in practice. The survey results confirm that 
in the case of Ukrainians and Russians migrants residing in Poland, there is a lack of evidence of any 
organized support from the country of origin and country of destination with respect to migrants’ 
integration in the receiving country. 
 

















Table of contents 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 7 
2. Immigration flows into Poland. The case of Ukrainian and Russian nationals ................................... 8 
2.1 Inflow of immigrants to Poland – general overview ............................................................... 8 
2.2 The migration patterns of Ukrainians and Russians to Poland ............................................. 11 
2.3 Ukrainian and Russian citizens in the Polish labour market ................................................. 12 
3. Institutional and policy framework and its impact on immigration flows of Ukrainian and Russian 
nationals to Poland ................................................................................................................................ 15 
3.1 General overview .................................................................................................................. 15 
3.2 Integration policy in Poland and its impact on immigrants from Ukraine and Russia.......... 16 
3.3 Emigration/diaspora policies of Ukraine and Russia and their influence on the integration of 
their nationals into Poland as a destination country .................................................................... 17 
4. Integration trends of Ukrainian and Russian migrants in Poland in light of the INTERACT survey 23 
5. Main conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 26 













Although Poland has been and still remains a net emigration country, its migration status is changing, 
and the transformation process into an emigration-immigration country is (slowly but steadily) 
becoming noticeable (see Górny et al. 2010). The size of the foreign population in Poland is still 
relatively small in comparison with other countries in Europe; it constitutes less than two percent of 
the resident population. Moreover, immigration has had a predominantly temporary and circular 
character (as opposed to settlement migration). The major groups of migrants come from eastern 
neighbouring countries. Among these, Ukrainians dominate in all statistics related to the entry, stay 
and work of foreigners in Poland. 
Poland’s profile as migration country is shaped first and foremost by its geo-political position in 
the European continent. Its accession to the European Union (the EU) in May 2004 and the fact that 
Poland became an EU border country influenced the dynamic and trends of human in- and outflows. 
As a result of EU member states opening their labour markets, a massive outflow of Poles took place 
within a short period after the date of the accession. The emigration reached its peak in 2007 when 
more than 2.3 million Poles (6.6% of the total population) were registered in other EU states as 
temporary residents (Fihel 2011: 25). The unexpected mass outflow on the one hand, and intensive 
economic growth and large investments in infrastructure and regional development (also due to EU 
funds) on the other, generated significant shortages in the labour market and growing demand for a 
foreign workforce in a relatively short time. Additionally, the long-term processes, such as serious 
depopulation (at present noticeable in some regions) and an aging population are expected to have a 
negative impact on the economy and society in Poland in the long run. 
Migration policy in Poland can be described as in statu nascendi (in the process of being formed). 
Due to its marginal scale, immigration is not the subject of any political party interest, and is not a 
topic of any serious political or public debate, in contrast with Western European countries where 
immigration is in the centre of political struggles. Despite the political and public “silence” over 
immigration issues, they have attracted increased attention from public administration bodies in recent 
years. The key role within the legal and political framework related to immigration is played by the 
central administration, the Ministry of Interior in particular. In 2012 a document was approved by the 
government entitled “Migration policy of Poland – the current state of play and further actions” which 
can be described as the national migration strategy (Ministry of Interior 2012b). It includes an 
overview of the present migration policy and recommendations for its further development in the area 
of law, institutional frameworks and integration programmes. 
Polish authorities perceive the increasing scale of foreigner inflows to Poland as an inevitable 
phenomenon due to the global processes taking place in Europe and worldwide. This perception is also 
related to the fact that as a member of the EU and part of the EU migration regime, Poland’s control 
over human flows within EU borders is limited in practice. Moreover, the negative demographic 
trends mentioned above, together with a growing demand for a foreign workforce, (especially in some 
sectors of the economy such as agriculture, construction), require wise political intervention and a 
thorough strategy to deal with these problems. In Poland, some signs of a transformation of migration 
policy from an abandonment approach towards an “opening-up” course of action are noticeable, 
especially in the case of the strategy addressing neighbouring countries (more precisely, Eastern 
Partnership (EaP)
1
 countries). The Eastern Partnership countries and Russia are, and will most likely 
continue to be, the main source countries of labour migrants in Poland. This pertains to Ukraine in 
particular. Poland (together with Sweden) initiated and advocated for the idea of the Eastern 
                                                     
1
 The Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, signed 7 May 2009, established the 
Eastern Partnership.  
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Partnership (one of the main aims of which is to liberalize the rules of movement of persons between 
those states and the EU (including the visa regime). 
Aside from the formulation of the state’s migration strategy, some other important and promising 
developments have appeared over recent years which could have an impact on increasing foreigner 
inflows to Poland. The most important has been the liberalization of labour-market admission rules for 
foreigners, including the implementation in 2007 of a new simplified scheme addressing short-term 
foreign workers. It allows employers to hire foreign workers from six Eastern countries (Ukraine, 
Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) for six months during twelve consecutive months. 
The aim of the system is to encourage employers to employ foreigners on a regular basis and to 
persuade foreign workers to use a legal option to enter and work in Poland. Ukrainians have 
constituted the vast majority of the foreigners entering Poland and taking up employment on the basis 
of this simplified scheme. 
Another novel policy has been the regularization programme implemented in 2012. As the third 
regularization programme in Poland (the others took place in 2003 and 2007), it turned out to be the 
most extensive (more than 9,500 people took advantage of the opportunity to apply for the legalization 
of their stay, and more than a half succeeded). The same year, the new Polish Citizenship Act came 
into force. It included new naturalization rules, such as the shortening of the qualifying period of 
residence from five to three years and the acceptance of dual or multiple citizenship. Also, in the area 
integration policy, some progress was noticeable. In 2013, the document “the Polish integration policy 
for foreigners – assumptions and guidelines” was published by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs; the ministry has continued to consult with non-governmental partners since then. 
The main aim of this report is to analyze the migration processes from Ukraine and Russia to 
Poland from the perspectives of the political frameworks existing in both the sending and receiving 
countries, with special attention to links between integration and diaspora policies and their roles in 
shaping migration flows. The report consists of five main sections. It opens with an introduction to the 
recent immigration processes of Ukrainian and Russian citizens’ into Poland. The next section takes a 
political perspective, discussing the migration and integration policy of Poland as a destination country 
on the one hand, and Ukraine and Russia’s political approach towards emigration as sending countries 
on the other. The purpose is to analyse the extent to which they either complement or conflict with 
each other. The final two sections focus on Ukrainian and Russian immigrants’ integration trends in 
Poland and analyse the explanatory factors of these trends.  
2. Immigration flows into Poland. The case of Ukrainian and Russian nationals  
2.1 Inflow of immigrants to Poland – general overview 
During Soviet times, the flows between Poland and the USSR were limited. The most numerous 
groups circulating between the two countries were petty traders and “false tourists” (entering Poland 
on a tourist status and engaging in casual work) (Okólski 1997a; Kępińska and Stola 2004). This 
phenomenon of trans-border trade and participation in the informal labour market was possible due to 
liberal entry rules and the existence of open-air bazaars in almost every town in Poland. Engagement 
in petty trade and undeclared work were well known practices from the socialist system and remained 
popular until the late 1990s. As a result, a high level of trans-border mobility was recorded between 
Poland and post-Soviet countries.
2
 
                                                     
2
 According to official data, between 1988-1995 the number of foreign citizens entering Poland increased from 6 
million to 82 million. Most of these visits were very short (from one to a few days) and their main purpose 
was shopping. The migrants were predominantly citizens of ex-Soviet republics, and of Ukraine in particular. 
(Okólski 1997a: 9-10). 
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In the 1990s, the predominant type of foreigner inflow to Poland was short-term, economic, 
circular (‘incomplete’) migration (Jaźwińska and Okólski 1996; Okólski 1997b; Stola 1997). 
Migrants’ principal goal was to benefit economically through genuine tourism or business (including 
shopping). They often stayed or worked on an irregular basis, and maintained close and steady 
contacts with their household in the home country (by means of regular communication, frequent 
home visits, remitting money, etc.) (Okólski 1997b: 10). Another important type of migration in this 
period was transit migration. It was comprised of people arriving from far-away regions (South 
Central and Western Asian and North African countries), the CEE region (Bulgaria and Romania), and 
neighbouring post-Soviet states. Transit migrants treated Poland as a stopping point on their way to 
Western Europe (Okólski 1997b: 12). 
The data on arrivals shows that Poland’s accession to the EU and Schengen zone and its visa and 
border-control system restrictions had an impact on the number of people coming to Poland from 
eastern neighbouring countries (the visa regime for neighbouring countries was introduced in 2003; up 
until 2007, visas for Ukrainians were issued free of charge). There was a serious drop just after the 
introduction of the visa regime, but shortly afterwards the number of border crossings increased again. 
This means that migrants acknowledged the new rules and got used to the new application procedures. 
According to data from the Polish Border Guards, the number of persons crossing the Polish-
Ukrainian and Polish-Russian borders has increased every year since 2008 (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Number crossing Poland’s border with Russia and Ukraine (2008-2013) 
Year 
Foreigners coming 
across the Russian 
border to Poland 






Change acc. to 
previous year 
2013 1,648,531 +62.4% 7,288,695 +15.9% 
2012 1,015,384 +51.9% 6,290,320 +17.1% 
2011 668,476 +54.8% 5,372,806 +19.8% 
2010 431,746 +27.2% 4,486,323 +37.3% 
2009 339,442 - 12% 3,268,027 +25.3% 
2008 385,820 - 45.9% 2,607,986 - 47.9% 
2007 712,539  5,003,963  
Source: Polish Border Guards.  
The trans-border flows possess a unique local particularity. Poland has signed local border-traffic 
agreements with all three of its eastern neighbours (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus). At present, two of 
them have come into force: with Ukraine in 2009 and with Russia (the Kaliningrad area) in 2012. The 
local border-traffic agreement allows certain groups of residents from border regions to cross the 
border with special local border-traffic permits instead of visas. However, they are limited to an area 
of up to 50 km from the border (in the case of Ukraine) and up to 90 days per half-year. There was 
anxiety that its implementation would create an uncontrolled gateway for irregular flows and 
smuggling processes. The data from the Polish Border Guard confirms, however, that the level of local 
border traffic remained at almost at the same level and that no negative impacts (e.g. increases in the 
irregular inflows) were noticed.  
Estimating the number of foreigners residing in Poland is not a simple task. According to the recent 
National Population and Housing Census (2011), almost 99.7 percent of permanent residents of 
Poland are persons with Polish citizenship. Among the population of foreigners residing in Poland, the 
most numerous group are Ukrainians (24,100), followed by Germans (9,200), Belarusians (7,500) and 
Russians (7,200). This means that the population of Poland is one of the most homogenised in Europe 
(in ethnic and cultural terms). 
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In the 2011 Population Census, foreign-born persons were asked to indicate their country of birth 
according to its current borders. Considering the fact that Poland’s territory changed significantly in 
the aftermath of World War II, this category includes thousands of Polish citizens born in Poland 
before 1939. Therefore, persons in this category should clearly not be recognized as a group of 
immigrants in a common meaning of this word. On that basis, 674,900 permanent residents of Poland 
(1.8%) were registered as born abroad. The major groups of foreign-born persons originate in today’s 
Ukraine (227,500), Germany (84,000), Belarus (83,600) and Lithuania (55,600) (Kaczmarczyk 2014: 
32-33). All of these countries are neighbouring countries of Poland. The great majority of these people 
are now over 60 years old, which suggests that these are Polish citizens who were born either in pre-
war Poland or were born abroad and relocated or became displaced during or after World War II. 
The number of foreigners registered in the Census as having a permit for settlement or for a fixed 
period in Poland is very small (63,000). However, it is commonly thought that the real number of 
foreigners residing in Poland (especially on a short-term basis) is much higher than recorded in the 
Census. The most important source of data comes from the Office for Foreigners. According to its 
records at the end of 2012 (31 December), almost 121,000 foreign nationals with valid residence 
permits (of all kinds) were registered in Poland (see Table 2). Just as in previous years, they were 
mostly permits for a fixed period (57,500, 47%). Among the most important nationalities were: 
citizens of Ukraine (37,000, 31% of all foreigners with valid residence permits), Vietnam (13,000, 
11%), Russia (12,000, 10%), and Belarus (11,000, 9%). Together, the citizens of three neighbouring 
countries (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) comprised approximately half of the foreign population 
possessing residence permits in Poland at the end of 2013. 
Table 2. Number of foreigners with valid residence permits in Poland (on 31 December 2013) 
acc. to status of residence (top five countries) 




































































































UKRAINE 7 17,959 2,198 142 1 17,372 37,679 
VIETNAM 1 4,340 1,947 368 4 6,744 13,404 
RUSSIA 2,243 4,813 425 610 530 4,024 12,645 
BELARUS 15 7,077 367 38 92 3,570 11,159 
CHINA 4 514 259 16 - 4,223 5,016 
All nationalities 2,446 51,027 7,490 1,838 888 57,529 121,218 
Source: The Office for Foreigners. 
One of the important categories of foreigners (not included in the Office for Foreigners’ records) is 
seasonal workers. They come to Poland using a scheme based on their employer’s declaration which 
allows them to stay and work for six months within a one-year period (see details in Section 3). In 
2013 there were 235,000 employer declarations issued (a year before the number reached 243,000). 
This group is twice as large as the number of foreigners possessing temporary-stay permits and five 
times as large as the population of foreigners with long-term stay permits. Moreover, most of the 
short-term migrants come from Eastern Partnership countries. In the period 2006-2009, the share of 
EaP citizens who arrived from abroad and registered for a temporary stay for longer than three months 
equalled approximately 40 percent of the total inflow of foreigners (as compared to 3-6 percent in the 
case of permanent immigrants). Ukraine is definitely the most important origin country of temporary 
immigrants coming to Poland, followed by Belarus, Armenia and Moldova. 
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Other categories of migrants include asylum seekers and recognized refugees. The number of 
persons under international protection in Poland is small – 5,100 persons under different forms of 
protection or possessing valid stay permits were registered at the end of 2013 (including 800 refugees, 
2,400 persons with a tolerated-stay status and 1,800 with complementary protection status). A 
significant increase in the number of applications for refugee status was noticeable in the last two 
years. The highest number of applications ever registered was in 2013 (15,000). The vast majority of 
them were submitted by Russian citizens (almost 85%; mostly by persons declaring Chechen 
nationality), followed by Georgians (8%), Syrians (2%), Armenians (1%) and Kazakhs (1%). Most of 
the applications were denied as unjustified. In 2013, only 1% of applicants were granted refugee status 
according to the Geneva Convention, 1.5% were granted tolerated-stay status and 0.5% –
complementary-protection status. 
Taking into account the different statistics, it can be assumed that the stock of foreigners in Poland 
is approximately 100,000-150,000 (meaning those who possess stay permits for longer than 3 months). 
Additionally, the number of seasonal foreign workers is approximately 250,000 a year. It should be 
stressed that when analysing the qualitative studies on immigration to Poland, the temporary 
(seasonal) type of inflows clearly dominates (Górny et al. 2010). Immigrants from Ukraine, Russia 
and other post-Soviet countries have limited interest in seeking permanent settlement in Poland.
3
 The 
factors influencing this fact are related to the immigrants’ main strategy, which can be described as 
“earn here, spend there”, and to their motivation to work abroad to improve living conditions at home. 
Moreover, the current legal and political framework (in terms of admission and employment) gives 
them the opportunity to circulate, encourages and sustains short-term mobility, and at the same time 
discourages long-term or settlement migration (Lesińska 2013).  
2.2 The migration patterns of Ukrainians and Russians to Poland 
The largest and most frequent group of foreigners arriving to Poland are citizens of Ukraine. They 
represent an immigrant group perceived to be the closest to Polish society due to geographic, cultural 
and linguistic proximity, past and present ties between the two nations, common history and last but 
not least, well-developed migration networks. The majority of Ukrainian migrants who reside in 
Poland come from Western Ukraine, which has historic connections with the Polish state, and where a 
substantial Polish minority continues to live. As a result, widespread cross-border contacts and 
mobility have existed over the Polish-Ukrainian border for decades.  
Ukrainian nationals in Poland represent first and foremost a short-term type of labour migration. 
Most of them circulate between Poland and Ukraine and do not intend to settle in Poland. Before 2007 
(when Poland became a member of Schengen zone), there were no serious barriers to entering Poland 
and therefore Ukrainians often applied for tourist visas, which allowed them to cross the border and 
stay for up to three months. During the time spent in Poland some of them overstayed their visas 
and/or worked irregularly. However it is difficult to estimate the scale of this phenomenon (Górny et 
al. 2010). In structural terms, Ukrainian immigration to Poland is strongly feminine, young and 
relatively well-educated. 
In contrast with Ukrainian migrants, who were intensively investigated by researchers over the last 
two decades (Jaźwińska and Okólski 1996; Stola 1997; Bieniecki and Pawlak 2009; Górny et al. 2010; 
Kindler 2011), migration strategies and structural features of Russian nationals in Poland are far less 
recognized and studied. The scale of the inflow of Russians to Poland is marginal in comparison with 
that of Ukrainians. However, it must be noted that Russians are the top nationality registered in 
asylum-seeker statistics (comprising approximately 90% of total asylum seekers every year). Also, in 
                                                     
3
 It is difficult to predict if and how this situation will change, given the unstable political situation in Ukraine 
related to the conflict with Russia.  
Magdalena Lesińska 
12 INTERACT RR2015/06 
2012, 24% of all persons obtaining a right to stay on the basis of supplementary protection had 
Russian citizenship. The vast majority of asylum seekers from Russia declare Chechen ethnicity.  
Both groups – Ukrainian and Russian nationals – are spatially dispersed over the territory of 
Poland. The only region with a high concentration of these migrants is the Mazowieckie region (which 
includes the capital city of Warsaw). They are also noticeable in eastern (border) regions 
(Podkarpackie and Lubelskie), which have relatively weak economic potential but a strong presence of 
migrant networks, in Małopolskie (in Kraków), Śląskie (in Katowice), and Pomorskie (in Gdańsk) 
(Fihel 2007; Duszczyk, Góra, and Kaczmarczyk 2013). 
The data from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education shows a steady increase in the number 
of foreign students coming to Poland. In the academic year 2012/2013, more than half the foreign 
students were nationals from EaP countries (13,500 of 24,200). The most numerous groups were 




An important characteristic of the inflows, which should be mentioned here, is related to ethnic 
patterns that were institutionalized by the Polish state through the introduction of the Polish Card 
(Karta Polaka) in 2007. These cards directly target ethnic Poles who are citizens of the former Soviet 
states. The main conditions for obtaining a Polish Card can be fulfilled by confirming Polish origin; 
confirming an active connection to “Polishness” by demonstrating at least a basic knowledge of the 
Polish language; and by proving that at least one parent, grandparent or two great grandparents were 
of Polish nationality or had Polish citizenship. Applicants must also confirm active involvement in 
Polish linguistic and cultural activities within the Polish community of their region for a period of at 
least the past three years.
5
 
The Polish Card entitles its holders to apply for a visa that allows multiple entrances to Poland (the 
cost can be reimbursed by the Polish state). It also provides a set of practical entitlements to its 
holders, such as an exemption from the obligation to have a work permit, the right to set up a company 
on the same basis as Polish citizens, and the right to study and participate in other forms of education. 
In practice, having a Polish Card simplifies the most difficult legal obstacles, such as the obligation to 
obtain a work permit and go through frequent visa-application procedures, and therefore serves as a 
pull factor, enabling migrants to come and work in Poland. The Polish Card became more and more 
popular among persons of Polish decent who were willing to come and live in Poland. In 2008-2012, 
more than 100,000 Cards were issued, approximately 90% of which were granted to citizens of 
Ukraine and Belarus. Far fewer were issued to Lithuanians, Russians and other nationalities. The 
majority of applicants have been young persons, often students, who use the card as a tool to simplify 
procedures related to arrival, stay and study in Poland.  
2.3 Ukrainian and Russian citizens in the Polish labour market  
As already mentioned in the introduction, the general approach to labour immigration in Poland 
started to change after its accession to the EU. Growing demand for a workforce in sectors which are 
traditionally popular among foreigners, such as agriculture and construction, led to significant changes 
towards the simplification of admission rules and employment procedures for foreigners. Poland 
decided to liberalize legislation on the employment of third-country nationals gradually, which is 
manifested in its facilitation of work-permit issuing regulations on the one hand, and expansion of the 
categories of foreigner groups allowed to work in Poland without a permit, on the other. 
It should be noted that any estimate of the scale of foreign employment in Poland is unreliable due 
to the ineffective labour-market monitoring system there and the unknown scale of irregular 
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 Data according to Fundacja Edukacyjna Perspektywy 2013. 
5
 Act of 7 September 2007 on the Polish Card (Journal of Laws of 2007, No 180, item 1280). 
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employment. The main sources of data related to this subject are statistics from the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy. There are two main streams of employment of foreigners in Poland’s labour market: 
the work permit system and a simplified scheme based on an employer’s declaration of intent to 
employ a foreigner. 
Poland’s eastern neighbours are recognized as its most important source countries for labour 
migration. The Polish government (despite its political orientation) has been the greatest advocate of 
the Eastern Partnership and the liberalization of the movement of persons from EaP countries to the 
EU. When analysing the data related to work permits issued, it is clear that firstly, the overall number 
of work permits is growing dynamically year after year and that, secondly, citizens of eastern 
neighbouring countries prevail in the statistics. In 2013, more than a half the work permits (52.2%) 
were issued to Ukrainians and 2.1% to Russians (see Table 3).  
The majority of Ukrainian migrants (up to 90%) undertake work while staying in Poland, and thus 
the notion ‘labour migrants’ seems particularly fitting. The majority of them work in Poland in the 
secondary sectors of the labour market (such as agriculture, the construction sector and household 
services). According to data from Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the sectors of the labour 
market in which Ukrainians are most commonly employed using the work permit scheme are 
construction and household services. Russians, on the other hand, are present in trade and the 
professional services sector. 
Table 3. Work permits issued in Poland for citizens of Russia and Ukraine, 2008-2013 
Year Country 
Ukraine Russia  All  
2008 5,400 420 18,022 
2009 9,504 540 29,340 
2010 12,894 491 36,622 
2011 18,669 549 40,808 
2012 20,295 719 39,144 
2013 20,416 822 39,078 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
In 2007, the supplementary scheme to the work-permit system, namely an employer’s declaration of 
his or her intent to employ a foreigner, was implemented. Its main aim was to simplify access to the 
labour market for short-term (seasonal) workers and to reinforce circular migration from eastern 
neighbouring countries. At the beginning, the declaration scheme was addressed only to citizens of 
Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. In 2009, it was extended to Moldovans and Georgians, and as of 2014, it 
also applies to Armenians. The foreigners employed on the basis of the employer declaration system 
are not obliged to have a work permit. Importantly, the procedure was originally limited to several, 
mostly typical, seasonal sectors, but has since been extended; today it includes a broad range of 
economic sectors (including highly-skilled ones). Just within the last 2-3 years this scheme became an 
entry gate for thousands of labour migrants (see Figure 1.).  
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Figure 1. Number of employer declarations issued in 2007-2013 
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
A year after the declaration scheme came into force, the number of employees hired in this manner 
began to rise significantly (from 21,000 in 2007 to 259,000 in 2011). It is important to note that the 
increase continued even during the economic downturn. Especially among Ukrainians, the employer 
declaration scheme has gained growing popularity over last years (see Table 4). In 2013, more than 
217,000 declarations (92% of the total) were issued for Ukrainians. The scale of declarations issued 
for Russians is at a much more moderate level: 1,200 declarations were issued in 2013 (0.5%).  
Table 4. The number of employer declarations, by nationality of workers, 2007-2013 
Year Nationality of worker 
Ukraine Belarus Russia Moldova Georgia Total 
2007 20,260 1,347 190 - - 21,797 
2008 142,960 12,606 1,147 - - 156,713 
2009 180,133 4,860 674 2,747 0 188,414 
2010 169,490 3,623 595 5,912 453 180,073 
2011 239,646 4,370 963 13,024 1,774 259,777 
2012 223,671 7,636 1,624 9,421 1,384 243,736 
2013 217,571 5,194 1,260 9,248 2,343 235,616 
Source: Own elaboration based on the data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
Analysing the official statistical data, one notices that Ukrainian citizens employed in Poland on a 
temporary basis are particularly concentrated in agriculture, construction and service sectors (around 
2/3 of all employer declarations are received from the first two sectors). In cases of more settled 
Ukrainian migrants, the variety of sectors is wider, including education and health services (Fihel 
2007). Russians are characterized by much less sectoral concentration, and in addition, the sectors are 
different – most of them are employed as professionals and in the trade sector. The distribution of 
declarations issued over a calendar year clearly shows the seasonality of employment based on the 
employer declaration scheme. Most of the declarations are registered by employers between February 
and May, and a very small number are registered in autumn and winter, which proves that this scheme 
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Despite the recent liberalization of access to the labour market, the scale of the employment of 
foreigners in Poland is still very limited. Simultaneously, a trend of growth can be observed, 
particularly as regards seasonal employment based on declarations issued to foreigners. The analysis 
of foreigners’ nationalities demonstrates that regardless of employment type, nationals from Ukraine 
and other EaP countries dominate. On the basis of the presented patterns of inflow, it is clear that the 
inflow of Ukrainians and Russians to Poland has a short-term character; the migrants are more 
interested in finding temporary employment in Poland and circulating between the two countries than 
in settlement. This can be described as “permanent temporariness” – the visits to Poland are short-term 
but the repetition of them makes migration a lasting phenomenon. This type of flow is also sustained 
by the existing legal and political framework implemented in Poland.  
3. Institutional and policy framework and its impact on immigration flows of Ukrainian 
and Russian nationals to Poland 
3.1 General overview 
In the early 1990s, Poland, among many other challenges related to its transition period, had to face its 
own transformation from a state with a restrictive exit policy and the forcibly- repressed spatial 
mobility characteristic of the communist regime (Stola 2001; Okólski 2004) to a democratic state with 
open borders. This change was difficult, given the fact that Poland has traditionally been a country of 
emigration, with little experience in regulating foreign inflows. After a relatively liberal admission 
policy post-1989, Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU led to the introduction of new and 
stricter rules and regulations (Weinar 2006). The first Aliens Act of 1997 narrowed the possible legal 
channels of migrant entry and tightened border controls. The 2003 Aliens Act included even more 
restrictive legal provisions regarding border control, the visa system and residence rights. The Act 
introduced visa requirements for citizens of a number of countries (including the closest neighbouring 
countries, and for Ukrainians and Russians) who had previously enjoyed visa-free movement. An even 
stricter admissions policy was generally implemented once Poland became part of the EU (2004) and 
the Schengen Group (2007). There is no doubt that membership in the EU is a crucial milestone in the 
development of immigration policy in Poland (Kicinger 2005; Weinar 2006; Duszczyk 2012). The 
requirements that Poland was obliged to fulfil as a new member constitute the key impulse for the 
development of the current legal and institutional system. Moreover, this process has been top-down, 
in response to external EU administrative guidance and pressures rather than to local immigration 
processes (Lesińska 2010: 58). In addition, due to its small scale, immigration is not yet perceived as a 
major social or political problem. It is not an issue in any political or public debates (in contrast to 
post-accession emigration issues). In fact, the process of the formulation and implementation of the 
policy can be described as a purely technocratic one. 
Over last years, several important developments related to immigration policy have been noticeable 
(most of which were already mentioned in the introductory part of this text). They all follow a trend 
which can be summarized as an evolution towards the slow and controlled opening-up of Poland to 
foreigner inflows. These developments have some serious limitations, however. They promote circular 
(as opposed to settlement) labour migration. Direct incentives to encourage inflows are directed 
primarily to EU citizens and nationals from eastern neighbouring countries, and are focused on legal 
and economic spheres (not on socio-cultural or political ones). As a result of recent economic 
development and the growing need for a labour force (as well as the mass emigration of Poles in 
recent years), Poland has become more and more attractive to foreign workers. Poland’s migration 
policy has shifted from protection against inflows to facilitation for desirable groups of migrants. The 
most important legal and political provisions which can be perceived as drivers of migration are 
related to the liberalization of labour-market entry rules for foreigners (the far-reaching simplification 
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of legislation concerning work permits in 2008,
6
 and the introduction of the employer declaration 
system – already mentioned above).  
3.2 Integration policy in Poland and its impact on immigrants from Ukraine and Russia  
In general, there is no complex, long-term and systematic state strategy concerning the integration of 
foreigners in Poland. The legal and institutional framework created to address this issue has been 
developed mostly in response to EU requirements and under EU guidance in order to align Polish 
migration law with relevant EU legislation. To a lesser extent, it has been developed to solve specific 
administrative problems that have emerged in practice (in order to remove loopholes and avoid 
interpretational discrepancies). Therefore, the development of integration policy in Poland can be 
portrayed as a reactive, centralized and top-down process. 
Integration policy in Poland is a set of ad hoc measures dedicated to particular groups. There is no 
coherent integration doctrine, and any legal provisions and integration programmes have until now 
been addressed only to two groups of incomers, namely recognized refugees and repatriates and their 
families. This can be explained first of all by Poland’s limited experiences with long-term immigrants 
requiring integration programmes, and secondly – by policy makers’ lack of interest in encouraging 
settlement migration.  
The state policy towards immigrants that has been implemented in Poland since the 1990s can be 
described as incorporation ‘via abandonment’ (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Weinar 2006). This means 
that there was limited institutional support from the state and NGOs. In addition, the migrant 
communities are poorly developed (with few exceptions), and the adaptation of immigrants to life in 
Poland has been difficult, especially for those of non-European origin. The integration system has 
been very selective and implemented on a small scale – there were only two special short-term 
integration programmes for two particular categories of immigrants: people with refugee (or 
temporary protection) status, and repatriates and their families. While the first was enforced by 
international law requirements (e.g. the Geneva Convention signed by Poland in 1991), the second 
resulted from a repatriation policy that has been in force in Poland since the mid-1990s. 
The long neglect of integration policy stems from a failure to recognize the emergent ethno-cultural 
diversity in this otherwise homogenous country, and from a belief that Poland is a transit country with 
‘unproblematic’ immigration, that is to say, dominated by immigrants of European origin with a very 
limited scale of settlement immigration. The issue of immigrant integration remains a low priority on 
the Polish political agenda (Lesińska 2010: 76). The official justification of the state’s narrow scope of 
activity in this area can be explained by its relatively low scale of foreigner inflows and their 
temporary (transit, circular) nature. Moreover, there are only a small number of settled immigrants, 
most of whom come from neighbouring eastern countries and have no serious integration problems, 
due to their cultural and linguistic compatibilities.  
Up until 2005, there was no official document detailing the integration issue and its scope in a 
manner other than in simple, general statements. The ‘Proposals of Actions Aimed at Establishing a 
Comprehensive Immigrant Integration Policy in Poland’, a document issued in 2013 by the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policy (which is officially responsible for integration policy), clearly confirm 
that “at present, integrative actions in Poland, within special individual integration programmes, are 
focused on one group of people only – those with refugee status”. Since then, the scope of 
beneficiaries of the state’s integration programmes has not changed. The only progress is visible in the 
development of the institutional structure. In 2013, the Working Group on the Integration of 
Foreigners was established within the Department of Aid and Social Integration (Ministry of Labour 
                                                     
6
 The Act of Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions of 19 December 2008 (the Journal of Laws 
2009, no 6 item 33). The Act eliminated the previous extremely-bureaucratized procedures regarding work 
permits and liberalized the procedures regarding the so-called labour market test.  
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and Social Affairs). The main aim of the group was to prepare the document “the Polish integration 
policy on foreigners – assumptions and guidelines”, which at present is being reviewed by non-
governmental partners. It is very small, but still, this initiative is progress within the area of integration 
policy in Poland, given that this subject has been of little interest to policy makers over the last 
decades. At present, the document has not yet been accepted as an official document by the 
administration, which means that it currently has no impact in practice. 
As regards legislation related to the incorporation of foreigners into the social security entitlements 
system, Polish law meets European standards. Foreign nationals working legally in Poland posses the 
same package of social rights as Polish citizens, including entitlements to pensions, medical care and 
unemployment benefits. With regard to the incorporation of foreigners into its legal-political system, 
Poland is still one of the most restrictive countries in Europe. Foreign residents have no voting rights 
at any level (with the exception of EU citizens, whose right to vote and be elected at the local level has 
been secured in EU law). Poland also did not sign the fundamental document encouraging the political 
participation of foreign nationals, namely the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Participation of 
Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level (adopted in 1992). In addition, foreigners are not 
represented in any labour union or political party in Poland. This explains why these institutions do 
not normally include immigration-related issues on their agendas. Moreover, even if the immigrants 
have the right to establish associations, their number and impact is very limited. Immigrant 
organizations are not recognized as influential actors by the state administration, and there is no 
institution – such as a consultative or advisory body – that could function as a forum for 
communication between immigrants and authorities at the central level. 
Despite the state’s generally passive attitude to the integration of foreigners, a more active 
approach is noticeable in the NGO sector. The interest in the implementation of projects aimed at 
migrants and in supporting their integration is strictly related to opportunities to apply for financial 
support from the EU (particularly from the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country 
Nationals, EIF Fund). Since 2007, diverse integration activities have been implemented by non-
governmental and local institutions following best practices adopted in other EU countries (language 
and adaptation courses, information campaigns, intercultural education programmes and training 
courses) using the support of the EIF fund. This means that in practice, the NGO sector is a partial 
substitute for state administration when it comes to the implementation of integration policy. 
3.3 Emigration/diaspora policies of Ukraine and Russia and their influence on the integration of 
their nationals into Poland as a destination country  
Amidst the factors influencing the patterns, types and scale of inflows, a key role is played by the 
legal, political and institutional frameworks implemented in both destination and source countries, 
which include entry/exit rules and the general situation of the economy and labour market. Therefore, 
a general overview of the policies currently in force in Ukraine and Russia addressing emigration and 
nationals abroad will be presented below. The aim of the overview is to identify any potential clash or 
convergence with the migration and integration policies of Poland as a destination country.  
The available analyses of emigration/diaspora policies in Ukraine and Russia underline that the 
primary focus of decision makers is linked to labour migration (specifically to nationals working 
abroad as a part of the international labour market) and to its negative consequences to the country, 
such as brain-drain. Also, the return migration of nationals from abroad has become an attractive issue 
recently in political campaigns and in the media in these countries (Makaryan 2013). 
Although it is difficult to say that there are separate diaspora policies adopted by the authorities of 
Russia and Ukraine, the emigration issue is included in various legislative acts and in bilateral 
agreements that regulate various aspects of the movement of people and the employment of nationals 
abroad. The legal framework is focused mostly on the protection of the rights of labour migrants 
abroad as guaranteed by bi- and multilateral agreements.  
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Ukraine 
Ukraine is a net emigration country. The size of the Ukrainian population residing abroad is estimated 
to be more than 6 million people, which means approximately 13% of the country’s population. 
Taking this into account, the emigration / diaspora policy should therefore be one of the priorities of 
Ukrainian authorities. According to the experts’ opinion, however, it is underdeveloped in terms of its 
strategy, legal and political framework and practical measures (Jaroszewicz and Szerepka 2007; 
Chumak and Kaźmierkiewicz 2009; Malynowska 2011; Tolstokorova 2012; Ivashchenko 2014). The 
institutional framework responsible for emigration and diaspora issues includes: the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (protection of the rights of citizens abroad and the development of ties with Ukrainian 
nationals residing abroad), the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and the Ministry of the Interior 
(which plays a supportive role in actions related to the labour migration of Ukrainians) (MPC Team 
2013). 
The Constitution of Ukraine of 1996 (in Section II: Human and Citizen Rights, Freedoms and 
Duties) guarantees a wide range of rights to Ukrainian nationals residing abroad, including access to 
voting rights in state elections, social benefits and cultural and educational services. It also ensures the 
right to return at any time, and guarantees care and protection to citizens staying abroad. These main 
principles are directly repeated in various political documents related to emigration and the diaspora 
which were implemented over last decade by Ukrainian authorities (e.g. the National Programme 
“Ukrainian Diaspora” for 1996-2000, the National Action Plan “Foreign Ukrainians” for 2001-2005, 
the presidential decree “the main directions of social policy until 2004” issued on 2000). The state 
priorities included in these documents are: to provide support to the development of relations between 
the Ukrainian state and its diaspora and to encourage the preservation of national identity, culture and 
language (Tolstokorova 2012). The urgency of establishing legal and socioeconomic grounds for 
regulating labour emigration, and the state’s obligation to protect the social and economic interests of 
Ukrainian workers were mentioned for the first time in the presidential decree of 2000 (ILO 2012: 12). 
Since then, the issue of emigration and the protection of the rights of Ukrainian nationals abroad has 
become one of the state’s priorities, at least in political documents and declarations.  
In 2004, the Programme on the Provision of Rights and Interests of Citizens Going Abroad for 
Employment and for Children Adopted by Foreigners was adopted. In the document, concluding 
bilateral and multilateral agreements on labour migration, introducing legal provisions for the control 
of intermediary agencies and tackling human trafficking were all declared priorities. The main aim of 
“the State Programme for Cooperation with Ukrainians Living Abroad up to 2015”, adopted in 2012, 
is to provide Ukrainian nationals residing abroad with financial and organisational support for their 
cultural and educational networks, and to envisage the protection of Ukrainian nationals abroad in the 
countries of their residence. In the programme above, the broad term “Ukrainians living abroad” was 
introduced to refer to second, third and fourth generation Ukrainians who lose connection with their 
historical mother country as well as with their national and cultural identity due to their social and 
spiritual adaptation to the realities of their countries of residence.
7
 The programme also underlines the 
need to engage Ukrainians residing abroad in development projects in Ukraine. Until now, however, 
there has been no evaluation of the programme to assess its value, impact and effects.  
As in other post-Soviet countries, the authorities of Ukraine link emigration policies to labour 
migration issues. The migration policy (conceptualized in the “State Migration Policy Concept” 
adopted in 2011) stresses the state’s role particularly with respect to strengthening the social and legal 
protections of Ukrainian citizens working abroad. One of the strategic points included in this 
document is “to strengthen the social and legislative protection of Ukrainians citizens working abroad 
by activating international collaboration, concluding international agreements on the rights of working 
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 A description of the programme is available (in English) on: http://www.iom.org.ua/en/legislation/migration-
related-legislation/state-program-of-cooperation-with-ukrainians-living-abroad.html [Accessed 20 June 
2014]. 
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migrants, their border crossings and allocations in the countries of employment and establishing 
favourable conditions for their return to Ukraine in order to decrease emigration flows” (see 
http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ukraine.php?aid=346 [Accessed 25 January 2015]). 
The main political instruments are international cooperation and bilateral treaties aimed at the 
protection of migrant workers’ rights. As a result, bilateral intergovernmental agreements on social 
security for Ukrainian migrants were signed between Ukraine and many countries from Central 
Eastern Europe (including Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland). Under the agreements, labour migrants are to be accorded the same rights and 
obligations as nationals, and benefits acquired in one country may be transferred to another. The 





 The agreement, which Poles and Ukrainians were deprived of before, 
guarantees that there will be no negative impact on insurance for citizens of Ukraine and Poland if 
they change their place of residence or employment to the other signatory country. Provisions of the 
agreement apply to contract workers and self-employed persons (as well as to members of their 
families) who are entitled to social insurance in the territories of both countries. It is expected that the 
agreement, by encouraging the elimination of double payments for businesses operating in both 
countries, will have a favourable impact on economic cooperation between the two countries. 
Although bilateral agreements on social security are a step in the right direction (to encourage legal 
employment and to provide incentives for migrant workers to return to Ukraine), their impacts are 
limited; they ensure social security rights only for the Ukrainian labour migrants who work legally in 
the signatory countries (ILO 2012).  
The “State Migration Policy Concept” of 2011, already mentioned above, declares that one of the 
state’s priorities with regard to emigration and the diaspora, is to create favourable conditions and 
mechanisms for the return of Ukrainian nationals residing abroad, and to take advantage of the socio-
economic investments of Ukrainian migrants in order to benefit the national economy (Coupé and 
Vakhitova 2013). The anticipated measures include stepping up cooperation with the destination 
countries through the ratification of bilateral agreements on social security and labour migration as well 
as work placement, arrangements for the recognition of certificates and qualifications and larger national 
quotas for qualified Ukrainian workers. The document also included policies directed towards return 
migrants and several proposed concrete incentives: improved opportunities for running small business, 
improved information about the availability of new jobs through the establishment of a national database 
of job vacancies and lowered fees for transferring migrants’ remittances (ILO 2012: 13). 
Despite all the above-mentioned political programmes and declarations, as of now, none that 
address return migrants and their families have come into effect as no budget funds have been 
allocated (Bogdan 2010). Moreover, there are no legal instruments encouraging Ukrainians to start 
their own businesses after their return and no special taxation relief for those who plan to invest 
money into the local economy. Problems with double taxation and the portability of social rights for 
migrants are also not yet regulated in practice.  
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 The text of the agreement is available (in Polish) on: 
http://www.mpips.gov.pl/gfx/mpips/userfiles/File/Departament%20Koordynacji/UMOWA.pl.pdf [Accessed 
25 January 2015]. 
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Russia 
Russia is first and foremost a net immigration country, pulling massive numbers of labour migrants 
from ex-Soviet countries. In contrast with issues relating to immigration and foreigners in Russia, 
which became a huge political and social problem over last decade, there has been little interest in 
emigration and diaspora issues. The situation has changed recently, however, in light of the recent 
crisis with Ukraine and conflict in the Crimea region. The wide debate on Russian state-obligations 
towards Russian-speaking persons residing abroad started at that point and the concept of Russian 
nationals abroad became highly politicized. The problem of depopulation in particular regions of the 
Russian Federation has also fuelled the state authorities’ growing interest in compatriots. Over the last 
years, there has also been a noticeable active development of a legal and institutional framework 
related to Russian nationals living abroad.  
According to different sources, the number of Russian nationals residing all over the world varies 
from 25 to 30 million (Tkach 2014). Instead of the term diaspora, expressions such as compatriots, 
nationals or Russian citizens living abroad are used in official documents related to Russian emigrants. 
Recently, broader terms – the Russian-speaking community or Russian-speakers – are also often used 
to refer to Russian diaspora worldwide. The dominant idea of a Russian policy towards Russian 
nationals residing abroad is based on two main objectives: developing and maintaining cultural ties 
between Russians abroad and the mother country, and facilitating voluntary resettlement (from the CIS 
and the Baltic states, in particular) (ibidem). 
The institutional framework responsible for emigration and diaspora issues includes the President 
and Government of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Migration 
Service (the Department for Relations with Compatriots), and the Federal Agency for the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian 
Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo, established in 2008 by Presidential Decree).
9
 The main aims of the 
latter are to implement projects to strengthen international ties, to support closer cooperation with 
Russians living abroad and to promote a positive image of Russia abroad. One of the agency’s key 
objectives is to promote Russian culture and Russian language abroad, including by teaching Russian 
via courses provided by the Russian Centres for Science and Culture. Although the agency is 
represented in approximately 100 countries all over the world, the CIS countries remain its priority 
and the Government Commission on the Affairs of Compatriots Abroad plays the role of coordinator 
in the process of implementing the projects addressed to Russian diaspora coordinating role. 
The main political document pertaining to Russian nationals abroad is the Foreign Policy Concept 
of the Russian Federation, which includes key principles, such as the protection of the rights and 
interests of Russian nationals abroad, and the reinforcement of the status of the Russian language in 
the world.
10
 The more detailed document, which specifies the framework of Russia’s diaspora policy, 
had already been adopted in 1999.
11
 This law proclaims different types of support for nationals 
residing abroad, including human rights protection, economic engagement with the national economy 
and mutual collaboration in the areas of culture, language and education. These main ideas were 
developed in a special programme addressing Russian diaspora – the Programme of Work with 
Compatriots Residing Abroad in 2013-2014.
12
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 See http://rs.gov.ru [Accessed 2 July 2014]. 
10
 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (signed in 2013), available on: 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F [Accessed 25 January 2015]. 
11
 The Federal Law No. 9 on the state policy of the Russian Federation concerning compatriots abroad, available 
on: http://rs.gov.ru/node/658 [Accessed 25 January 2015]. 
12
 The Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1149-p, 5 July 2013. The Programme of Work 
with Compatriots Residing Abroad in 2013-2014, available on: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
dgpch.nsf/215bdcc93123ae8343256da400379e66/f1e4442a0211341644257bb1002bc70f!OpenDocument 
[Accessed 25 January 2015]. 
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In response to the demographic crisis and the pessimistic population prognosis (especially for 
peripheral regions in Russia which are seriously threatened with depopulation), the authorities 
attempted to mitigate these negative trends by facilitating the resettlement of nationals from abroad. A 
dedicated programme was implemented to achieve this aim: the State Program to Assist Compatriots 
Living Abroad in their Voluntary Resettlement in the Russian Federation, approved by Presidential 
Decree in 2006.
13
 This programme is oriented mainly toward Russians born in the USSR and their 
descendants – that is, Russian nationals living mostly in the ex-Soviet states, who are not emigrants 
per se. The aim of this program is to help reallocate Russian-speakers into particular regions in Russia 
(depopulated, strategic border regions and regions with intensive investment policies) (Molodikova 
2007: 13). The dedicated institutional and legal structures were developed to implement the 
programme, including the special department within the Federal Migration Service for the 
management of work with compatriots. The programme guarantees a compensation package including 
reimbursement of all travel expenses, and additional assistance with employment and housing. Despite 
expectations, the programme did not prove popular among Russians. living in countries of the former 
Soviet Union (Tkach 2014). 
There are no particular agreements on sending Russian workers abroad. The legal framework on 
cooperation between Russia and the EU includes the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, 
Establishing a Partnership between the Russian Federation and the EU (1994).
14
 It guarantees that 
Russian citizens can be legally recruited, on equal terms with the citizens of the EU states with regard 
to working conditions, benefits or dismissal. In 2006, the Agreement on Readmission between the 
Russian Federation and the EU was also signed.
15
 There are also a number of bilateral agreements on 
double taxation signed with more than 80 states, including EU countries. The Agreement between the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Poland on the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Property had already been signed in 1992. 
One of the instruments to strengthen the ties between nationals residing abroad and their mother 
country and to keep emigrants interested in the situation of their home country is granting them 
suffrage in national elections. Russian citizens residing outside the territory of the Russian Federation 
have full voting rights in federal bodies (including parliamentary and presidential elections) and can 
also participate in voting on national referenda at ballot stations established abroad. Having dual 
citizenship is also allowed by Russian law, which means that a Russian citizen receiving citizenship 
from another country is not required to terminate citizenship from the Russian Federation. 
Table 5 summarizes the main characteristics of the legal and institutional frameworks that are 
related to emigration/diaspora policies in Ukraine and Russia. 
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 The text of the programme is available online: http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/structure/management/nash/ 
[Accessed 6 July 2014]. 
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 Available on: http://eu-law.ru/россия-и-ес/спс/ [Accessed 25 January 2015]. 
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 Available on: http://eu-law.ru/2011/05/coglashenie-o-readmissii/ [Accessed 2 July 2014]. 
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Table 5. Legal and institutional frameworks of emigration/diaspora policies: Ukraine vs. Russia 
 
Ukraine  Russia  
Legal framework for 
emigrants/diaspora 
Formal and organized structure Formal and organized structure 
Approach towards 
emigrants 
Protect the social and economic 
rights and interests of Ukrainian 
workers abroad; encourage 
emigrants to send remittances; 
engage Ukrainians residing 
abroad in development actions 
Protect the rights of labour migrants in 
destination countries; develop strong 
relations with the mother country; 
implement projects to strengthen 
international ties; support closer cooperation 
with Russians living abroad; promote a 
positive image of Russia abroad 
Main state-actors 
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs;  
- Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy, Ministry of the Interior 
- Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Compatriots Living 
Abroad and International Humanitarian 
Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo); 
- President and Government of the Russian 
Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Federal Migration Service 
Main official documents  
The State Programme for 
Cooperation with Ukrainians 
Living Abroad up to 2015 
(adopted in 2012) 
Programme of Work with Compatriots 
Residing Abroad in 2013-2014 
Socio-economic rights 
Bilateral agreement on social 
security (signed 2012) 
Bilateral agreement on the avoidance of 
double taxation of income and property 
(signed in 1992) 
Political rights 
Right to vote in parliamentary 
elections 
Right to vote in presidential and 
parliamentary elections  
Language and cultural 
rights 
Provide Ukrainian nationals 
residing abroad with financial 
and organisational support for 
their cultural and educational 
networks 
Promotion of Russian culture and language 
abroad, including teaching Russian via 
courses provided by the Russian Centres for 
Science and Culture 
Dual citizenship  Accepted  
Accepted when a Russian citizen obtains 
second citizenship, but when a foreigner 
applies for Russian citizenship – he/she is 
obliged to renounce the previous one 
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4. Integration trends of Ukrainian and Russian migrants in Poland in light of the 
INTERACT survey 
The INTERACT survey was an exploratory survey conducted between December 2013 and September 
2014. The survey targeted civil society organisations working in 82 countries (28 EU countries of 
destination and 54 countries of origin with more than 100,000 migrants residing in the EU). Any 
organisation dealing with migrant integration in one of the eight dimensions (labour market, 
education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, 
housing) could take part in the survey. Respondents could choose between one and three integration 
dimensions in which their organisation was active. The survey was translated into 28 languages and 
over 900 responses were collected online and over the phone. Although the exploratory character of 
the survey does not allow one to make generalisations about the whole population of civil society 
organisations, it does shed light onto the ways that these actors’ activities impact migrant integration 
between the origin and destination countries. However, the survey does much more than just mapping 
these activities in a comparative context; it shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their 
policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. 
This report presents information pertaining only to Ukrainian and Russian migrant groups in Poland. 
In Poland, 24 representatives of organizations working with migrants took part in the survey. Those 
organizations claimed to work with Russian and Ukrainians migrants residing in Poland, in addition to 
other migrant groups. Before presenting the general conclusions from the survey, an important point 
should be noted concerning the profile of Russian and Ukrainian migrants who receive assistance from 
the surveyed organizations. The organizations which work with the Russian migrant population in 
Poland deal with refugees and/or asylum seekers who have Russian nationality (and Chechen 
ethnicity), but this group is not representative of the population of Russian migrants residing in 
Poland. On the other hand, the Ukrainian migrants who contact the organizations serving migrants in 
Poland are usually labour migrants pursuing temporary stay and employment in Poland. Taking this 
into account, the survey evidence must be interpreted with some reservations, and should not be 
interpreted as referring to the general population of Ukrainian and Russian migrants in Poland. 
The most common profiles of organizations whose representatives took part in the survey were 
foundations and associations. Several international organizations with agencies in Poland also 
participated. 
The results of the survey confirm the fact that immigration from Russia and Ukraine to Poland is 
structurally different, a fact which is also supported by other data sources (presented in the previous 
sections). The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian migrants to Poland are labour migrants. The 
second most important category (family reunification) is of much lesser importance. In the case of 
Russian citizens, the structure of incoming migrants is far more diverse with approximately 20% of 
persons coming to Poland for family reasons, over 21% for work-related reasons and over 20% for 
humanitarian reasons (the majority of those people are Chechen asylum seekers), see Table 6. below.  
Table 6. Main reasons for migration to Poland in the case of Ukrainian and Russian migrants 
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Note, however, that the table presents averages for 2010-2012, and this data has changed very 
recently. Due to recent political events in Eastern Ukraine, the scale of Ukrainian immigration to 
Poland has increased significantly and in addition, the importance of humanitarian immigration has 
grown immensely. In 2013, the number of asylum claims by Ukrainian citizens was as high as 46. In 
2014 (until end of October) it amounted to 1,876, i.e. over 40 times higher (data from the Office for 
Foreigners). Similarly, by the end of October 2014 a total of 707,166 visas had been issued to 
Ukrainians, as compared to 720,125 for the entire year of 2013 (data from the Polish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs); the number of seasonal migrants increased as well – 183,000 of the declarations to 
employ a foreigner were issued in the first half of 2014, as compared to 137,000 in the first half of 
2013 (data from the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy). However, it must be pointed out 
that Russians are the top nationality registered in asylum seekers statistics (see Section 2). The vast 
majority of asylum seekers from Russia declare Chechen ethnicity. 
It is difficult to estimate the real interest of migrants in obtaining assistance from migrant 
organizations. The organizations that took part in the survey reported that approximately 50 migrants 
(of Ukrainian and Russian nationality) contacted them asking for assistance in the period of the last 
twelve consecutive months. According to collected data, the medium-large organizations were the 
most popular destinations for migrants searching for assistance. The relatively small number of 
migrants who contact organizations confirms the hypothesis that the most common source of 
assistance and information for migrants are other migrants and representatives of their social networks. 
The results of the survey show that the most common tasks of the organizations that participated in 
the research first and foremost include the provision of up-to-date and reliable information related to 
the legal and institutional framework and labour-market conditions in Poland (including information 
about available jobs). Other possible areas of service offered by these organizations (such as lobbying 
for recognition of qualifications or support for training) appeared to be much less important. 
Additionally, the surveyed organizations’ areas of activity that address Ukrainian migrants seem to be 
more diverse (in comparison with activities addressing Russian migrants). Among other things, they 
provide services such as informing Ukrainian migrants about student opportunities abroad. This is 
probably related to the fact that among foreign students at Polish universities, Ukrainians are the 
predominant group. Many young Ukrainians are interested in study opportunities in Poland and other 
countries.  
Several questions in the survey were linked directly to the role of language in relation to the 
country of origin and country of destination. The representatives of the surveyed organizations were 
asked to identify the main channels for learning the language of the country of origin while being in 
Poland. According to their responses, it can be assumed that the main ways are related to kinship, on 
the one hand, and to cultural events and the media, on the other. Travelling back to the country of 
origin appears to be another important situation that facilitates the process of learning the country-of-
origin language. At the same time, the respondents indicated that schools, religious organizations and 
other associations play a less important role with respect to migrants and their children learning the 
country-of-origin language. When asked about the sectors of labour market where the native language 
could be used and be an added value, respondents indicated sectors such as teaching and translation 
services, as well as tourism, international organizations and diplomatic missions. 
Another section of the survey was dedicated to the labour market. In one of the questions, 
respondents were asked to indicate the effectiveness of particular instruments in helping migrants to 
find a job in the destination country. The representatives of organizations working with Ukrainian and 
Russian migrants tend to believe that associations in the country of origin are more important in this 
respect than any official instruments implemented by the country of origin (such as governmental 
policies, initiatives supporting the employability of migrants abroad or official pre-departure 
programmes). In the case of organizations working with Russian migrants, there was significantly less 
belief in the importance of measures provided by either associations or the government in the country 
of origin. The representatives surveyed also admit that their organizations’ impacts on migrants’ 
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position in the Polish labour market is in practice very limited. Furthermore, it seems that their impacts 
on other issues related to the labour market, such as wage levels or occupational skills-matching, also 
remains marginal. 
A separate section of the survey was dedicated to the social integration and civic and political 
participation of migrants. In general terms, the representatives of the organizations surveyed believe 
that the country-of-origin policies that pertain to migrants’ social relations have a positive impact on 
migrants’ integration in the destination country (however, there were also a few responses that 
indicated both positive and negative impacts). At the same time, what should be underlined here, in 
both cases –the Ukrainian and Russian migrant populations in Poland – is that governmental support 
from the country of origin is in practice very low, and is generally limited to legal assistance available 
from consulates. All respondents provided negative answers to the question related to country-of-
origin governmental support for the establishment of organizations such as official representations, 
schools, religious institutions or cultural centres in the destination country. It clearly shows a serious 
gap between the legal and institutional frameworks that officially exist within the state political system 
in the countries of origin (see Section 3 of this paper), and their implementation in practice. 
One of the most striking outcomes of the survey is related to the civic and political participation of 
migrants. Generally, its level is very low in practice, and moreover, organizations working with 
migrants do not provide any services in the area of civic and political participation in the country of 
origin. According to survey results, respondents felt that the civic and political participation of 
migrants in the country of origin had no effect on any area of their lives in the country of destination. 
In other words, participation (or non- participation) in the political and public spheres of the country of 
origin does not influence social relations, school performance, religious practices or the residential 
integration of migrants in the country of residence (this is especially clear in case of Russians). It can 
be explained, on the one hand, by the characteristics of migrant groups that were the subject of the 
survey (Ukrainians are not interested in deeper integration into the social and political sphere in 
Poland because they believe that their residence there is temporary; moreover, it is difficult to expect 
that Russian migrants (who are in fact Chechen asylum seekers) would be engaged in any political or 
public activities taking place in Russia. Additionally, the lack of visible institutional support from the 
countries of origin is an important piece of the puzzle in this picture. 
Although, there is no data indicating the number of migrants who keep the passport (and 
citizenship) from their previous country while naturalizing in Poland, it can be assumed that many do; 
moreover, Polish law accepts double citizenship. According to respondents, migrants most commonly 
decide to keep the passport of their country of origin because it is seen as an asset in the country of 
destination (as in the case of Ukrainian migrants), and for sentimental reasons (migrants feel attached 
to their country of origin, which is the common answer in the case of Russian migrants). 
To conclude, the survey shows the following: 1) organizations working with migrants have an 
insignificant role in Ukrainian and Russian migrants’ integration process in the country of destination; 
2) there is no evidence of any organized support from the country of origin for migrants’ integration 
process in the country of destination; in other words – there is a gap between the legal and institutional 
frameworks that officially exist within Russian and Ukrainian state systems to address nationals living 
abroad and their implementation in practice; 3) the activities of organizations working with migrants 
are focused on assisting them with their process of adaptation in the labour market in the country of 
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5. Main conclusions 
The migrant profile of Poland is dynamic. Although it remains a net emigration country, the size of the 
foreign population in Poland is growing. However, this population has a predominantly temporary and 
circular, not settlement, character. The major groups of migrants come from eastern neighbouring 
countries, with Ukraine being the main source country. Ukrainian nationals in Poland represent first 
and foremost a short-term type of labour migration; most of them circulate between Poland and 
Ukraine with a limited intention of settling down in Poland. However, this situation may change, given 
the political instability in Ukraine as a result of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The second 
migrant group investigated in this report were Russians, who constitute a much less numerous group 
of migrants, but at the same time – a much more diverse group. Within the category of Russian 
migrants in Poland, we can find specialists and highly-qualified workers on the one hand, and refuges 
and asylum seekers, on the other. It is important to note that every year approximately 90% of asylum 
applications in Poland are submitted by Russians of Chechen ethnicity. 
The report’s analyses of the immigration and integration patterns of Ukrainians and Russians 
residing in Poland cover the role of both the country of destination and countries of origin. 
Over last years, there has been a noticeable evolution of migration policy in Poland towards a slow 
and controlled opening-up to foreigner inflows. This evolution has serious limitations, however, such 
as the promotion of specific types of inflows (circular, as opposed to settlement) and the fact that the 
policy targets particular groups of migrants: EU citizens and nationals from eastern neighbouring 
countries. The most important legal and political provisions which could be perceived as drivers of 
immigration are related to the liberalization of labour-market entry rules for foreigners (via the 
simplification of legislation concerning work permits and the introduction of an employer declaration 
system). Moreover, another important factor influencing corridors of migrant flows and integration 
patterns is the lack of a long-term and systematic integration policy addressing foreigners residing in 
Poland. The legal and institutional framework related to migrant integration can be portrayed as a 
reactive, centralized and top-down system, and by no means should be treated as a driver encouraging 
migrant inflows and settlement processes. Despite the state’s generally passive attitude to the 
integration of foreigners, a more active approach to the integration of foreigners is noticeable in the 
NGO sector, which can be described as a partial substitute for state administration when it comes to 
the implementation of integration policy. 
In analysing the emigration / diaspora policies of Ukraine and Russia, it must be stressed that the 
primary focus of these policies are nationals working abroad and the resulting negative consequences 
to the country such as brain-drain and depopulation. The return migration of nationals from abroad has 
also become an attractive issue recently in political campaigns and in the media in these countries. 
Although it is difficult to say that there are any separate diaspora policies that have been adopted by 
authorities of Russia and Ukraine, the emigration issue is included in various legislative acts and in 
bilateral agreements that regulate various aspects of the movement of people and the employment of 
nationals abroad. The legal framework is focused mostly on the protection of the rights of labour 
migrants abroad, as guaranteed by bi- and multilateral agreements, and on keeping relations between 
nationals residing abroad and the country of origin as active as possible. 
The survey, which was conducted with representatives from various organizations in Poland that 
work with migrants, adds yet another layer to the picture. The survey results confirm several important 
conclusions. In the case of Ukrainian and Russian migrants in Poland, they show the organizations’ 
marginal roles in the migrants’ integration process in their country of residence. Moreover, according 
to respondents, there is no evidence of any organized support from the countries of origin with respect 
to migrants’ integration in their country of residence. This means that there is a serious gap between 
the legal and institutional frameworks that officially exist within the Russian and Ukrainian state 
systems to address nationals living abroad, and their implementation in practice. These survey results 
confirm the fact that, in this particular case, neither the country-of-destination nor country-of-origin 
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governments care about migrant integration. Moreover, the activities of organizations working with 
migrants are predominantly focused on assisting migrants with their process of adaptation within the 
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